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Commander James J. Tritten USN
Since there 1s an American and a NATO maritime strategy, it 1s often
assumed that the Soviet Union also has its own maritime or naval strategy.
Whether or not the USSR has, or should have a separate maritime or naval
strategy, has long been the sub.iect of debate in both Western and Soviet
1 iterature. 1
Under the category of Soviet military science, debate is permissible on
questions of military strategy, military art, operational art, and tactics.
Such a debate took place on the pages of the main Soviet Navy journal , Morskoy
Sbornik , from April 1981 through July 1983. This exchange of ideas is worth
scrutinizing in order to gain some Insight Into the Soviet military and the
opinions of the new head of their navy, Admiral V. N. Chernavin. Both
Chernavin and Fleet Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, then Commander-in-Chief, were
participants.
A main issue in this open exchange of views was the degree of relative
Independence that naval warfare should have in Soviet military science. Could
the navy have its own "strategy" or would it be limited to a less specific but
separate "theory" which all services were allowed? A theory of the navy, as
part of military science, would allow the navy to discuss hypotheses about
warfare that exceed the parameters of the strategies approved by the General
Staff. These types of questions are not unfamiliar to us in the West; we too,
often debate and discuss the role of command and control of naval forces that
are acting in support of campaigns ashore; or the relationship of our maritime
strategies to overall national or allied military strategies.
Ever since he headed the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov wrote that the
navy should have a significant role in deciding the roles and missions of his
fleet, to include when operations were "joint" or combined the efforts of more
than one service. The Admiral often stated that the command and control of
military forces, other than naval, in distant oceanic theaters of military
operations, should be conducted primarily by naval commanders rather than by
the marshals ashore.
Despite his advocacy of some naval independence, Gorshkov embraced the
concept of a unified single military strategy at least as early as 1966. 2 By
1979, which saw the second edition of his The Sea Power of the State , Gorshkov
made it extremely clear that although there could only be one unified military
strategy for the employment of all military forces, there had to be options
for the strategic employment of certain types of forces that operated in more
uniaue environments. Additionally, the Admiral argued that under a combined
arms doctrine of warfare, one service should not be allowed to dominate any
particular sphere of military affairs.
In April and May of 1981, a two part article authored by one of the
Soviet Navy's leading theoreticians, Vice Admiral K. Stalbo, appeared In
Morskoy Sbornik .3 Stalbo, as a frequent contributor to the journal, was
acknowledged by Admiral Gorshkov as having provided assistance in the
preparation and review of the Sea Power of the State . The Stalbo articles are
required reading for students of both naval warfare and the relationship of
fleets to a nation's entire military effort. Some of the major points made by
Stalbo were:
(1) There is only one uniform military strategy, not a separate and
unique strategy for the navy.
(2) The navy can influence the course of a future war, primarily due to
weapons carried aboard nuclear missile submarines.
(3) A future war would likely be global, involve all mediums, and might
be protracted.
(4) The planned strategic employment of the fleet determines its roles
and missions.
(5) In a future war, a navy must attack an enemy's main and most heavily
defended forces.
Stalbo went on to define naval art as a subdivision of military art,
being composed of: a theory of the strategic employment of the navy, and
theories of naval operational art and naval tactics. The former provides a
framework for the discussion of the necessity for a navy and what a nation
might expect that navy to accomplish. In Stalbo's words, the strategic
employment of the navy will accomplish the naval portion of the overall
combined arms objectives under the framework of a unified military strategy.
Operational art and tactics define how navies will operate 1n order to carry
out missions 1n war at the operational or tactical level.
The Admiral was careful to distance himself from "Mahanlsts" 1n the West
who overstress the Importance of naval warfare and "sea supremacy." Stalbo
clearly fell 1n Hne with the general premise of Soviet military doctrine that
there must be a proper balance between all types of military forces. He also
repudiated the use of the term "naval strategy" and emphasized that the
resources allocated to navies will be determined by the overall needs of the
military as a whole and the role assigned to the navy under unified doctrine
and strategy.
As with the case of the dog that did not bark, 1t is important to note
that Stalbo did not use this opportunity, when discussing the major theories
of military science, to argue that navies can "win" wars or even influence the
outcome of a war or the armed conflict portion of the overall war effort.
Stalbo simply argues that navies can influence the course of a war.
Over the next two years, the Stalbo articles were followed by seven
others that discussed, expanded upon, or debated the major points that he
made. The first of these was authored by Rear-Adm1ral G. Kostev, head of the
naval faculty at the Lenin Political -Military Academy. 4 Kostev argued for a
separate "theory of the navy," since, 1n his view, naval warfare was conducted
In a peculiar medium and had some missions that were purely "naval" (such as
disruption of the sea lines of communication or the conduct of antisubmarine
or an ti surface warfare in remote ocean regions). Kostev's arguments were not
unlike those expressed by naval officers in the West; with the implication
that command and control of fleet assets Is best left to professional naval
officers.
Admiral V. N. Chernavin, who later relieved Admiral Gorshkov as head of
the Soviet Navy, authored the second follow-on article in the series. ^ Then
the Chief of the Main Navy Staff, Chernavin suggested that Stalbo may have
overemphasized the importance of naval warfare and had not adequately
addressed the requirements of a combined arms approach to warfare under one
unified military strategy. Considering that Stalbo did stress these points,
it seems proper to conclude that Chernavin used his article to distance
himself from Stalbo and further identify himself with those political -military
leaders in the USSR who were advocating a combined arms approach to warfare.
Admiral V. Sysoyev, Commander of the Marshal Grechko Naval Academy,
authored the next article in the series. 6 This article also stressed the
unified nature of Soviet military strategy and the Soviet combined arms
approach. A fourth article, by Captain 1st Rank B. Makeyev, Indirectly
criticized Stalbo, by again stressing the top-down approach to the acquisition
of naval weapons systems, in a yery systematic, almost cybernetic process.
?
Makeyev sketched out an acquisition process that takes as inputs the overall
political guidance, the realities of economic constraints, the roles and
missions of other services in the maritime theaters, and the likely enemy,
prior to the development of any program to acquire armaments. Makeyev 's
article 1s a "must" for all strategic planners and those Interested 1n a
systemic approach to acquisition.
Rear-Admiral V. Gulln and Captain 1st Rank Yu. Borlsov collaborated in a
fifth article 1n the series that once again stressed unified military strategy,
but this time with some Ideological overtones. 8 The sixth article 1n the
series was authored by Admiral V. Ponikarovsky, Director of the Naval College.
^
Ponlkarovsky tended to agree with most of Stalbo's original points and
expanded the discussion to a need for a theory of forces control.
The seventh article In the follow-on debate was authored by Captain 1st
Rank V. Shlomln. 1 ^ Shlomln made the strongest case of all of the authors for a
unified single military strategy. It was the only article that was
individually criticized by Admiral Gorshkov when he ended the debate in July
1983 with a final article entitled "Questions of the Theory of the Navy." 11
Perhaps the extreme position of Captain Shlomln gave Gorshkov the strawman he
needed to criticize the more extreme proponents of a "unified" approach to
warfare.
In the final article, Gorshkov attempted to build a consensus around the
basic points that had been originally raised by Stalbo. The then commander of
the navy stated that the economic potential of the state limited the types of
weapons systems which could be built and that the actual weapons on hand
limited the types of strategies that could be developed. Gorshkov also
explained that it was political needs that determined the role and missions for
the armed forces and that although those roles and missions could be debated
under military science, they would would then be promulgated by a single
unified military strategy.
Gorshkov further explained that the navy, Hke all of the military
services In the USSR, was allowed to have Its own theory of the navy as a part
of the overall military science; I.e. Independent theory could be debated but
there was no Independent naval strategy under a combined arms approach to
warfare. Although the navy could have an Independent operational art and
tactics, these were subordinate to overall military art. Gorshkov did argue
that in remote ocean regions of the world, naval operational art should guide
combined arms military operations. Figure (1) outlines these concepts.
In ending the debate, the admiral made as strong a case as he could,
given the constraints of Soviet military thought, for the unique character of
certain aspects of naval warfare. He also stressed that navies have remained
important in the modern era. He did not state that navies could win the war,
or even the armed conflict portion of a war, or even influence the outcome of
either. Gorshkov praised the flag officers who had contributed to the debate
and noted that the discussion on the pages of Morskoy Sbornik was very useful
and important.
What is the significance of these articles? First, it is that a degree
of debate is permissible under Soviet military science and that this debate
often takes place in the open literature. Debate begins with a clearly
recognizable signal (i.e. the Stalbo articles) and ends with the firm shutting
of a door (i.e. the Gorshkov piece). This suggests that the available Soviet
literature should be collected and analyzed using rigorous content analysis.
Proper accounting should be made as to the appearance and repetition of themes
over time, the authority of the author, the medium, and the intended audience.
By performing such analysis, we have an opportunity to gain insight into the
Russian mind and to better identify and thus understand the differences in the
way in which major political -military issues are approached. 12
From such analysis, 1t 1s possible to set the significance of major
statements Into context; I.e. Chernavln's orthodoxy 1n light of his subsequent
promotion. Similarly, we can construct Soviet "declaratory" theories,
strategies, policies, etc., or what 1t 1s that they are openly trying to
communicate externally or Internally.
Secondly, the basic principles of military doctrine and strategy that
were contained in the original Stalbo articles were not challenged by the
debate and were reaffirmed by Gorshkov at its end. Hence, to understand the
naval and maritime aspects of Soviet military doctrine and strategy, we in the
West must read what the Politburo leaders, the Ministry of Defense, and the
marshals have to say; 1f we read only the admirals, we will not grasp major
points on the possible strategic objectives in a future war.
For example, if we are to search for evidence that the Soviets might use
their nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine fleet for inter or post-war
bargaining and negotiations, then one should expect to find references in the
literature to navies having the ability to influence the outcome of wars or
armed conflicts. The last time that Gorshkov stated this was in 1979*3. None
of the Ministers of Defense or heads of the Politburo has ever seconded this
claim nor did any of the participants in this recent debate.
In the series on naval theory, the character of a future war was not
debated. Stalbo claimed that it would "assume a global character" and that it
might "last from several weeks to a month or more." We need to search through
the Soviet literature to see if this is what is being said by those senior to
the participants. In doing so, we should be able to uncover if this is indeed
current military doctrine or whether or not 1t is part of an on- going debate
in which the navy is using such arguments to justify existing, or even an
expanded portion of defense resources. Such analysis may give us Insight Into
the character of military strategy; 1f future war 1s characterized under
doctrine as likely being long, then strategies to execute long wars will
logically be developed. Without cross-checking, one can only speculate.
Although one might have assumed that Admiral Chernavln, a submariner,
would have used his article to champion the role of submarines, It was Stalbo
who performed this role. Stalbo accorded the primary strategic effort of
fleets to the nuclear-powered strategic missile submarine and for warfare
conducted against them. For example, Admiral Stalbo stated that the
destruction of a single Trident ballistic missile submarine was a strategic
objective in Itself. In Soviet terminology, strategic objectives have the
highest possible status, since their attainment can have an impact on the war
as a whole or in a particular theater of military operations. Stalbo further
stated that "it would be erroneous to underestimate the theory of strategic
employment of fleets having submarine nuclear-missile systems as the basis of
their combat might."
Stalbo also said that in a future war, a navy must attack an enemy's main
and most heavily defended forces. This is classic Mahan although no Russian
naval officer would readily admit to this. One can interpret Stalbo's
comments to mean either that the Russians intend their military forces to
engage the most heavily defended high value units 1n enemy navies (Including
ballistic missile submarines); or that they expect that their enemies will do
the same to them. Both Interpretations are probably correct.
Gorshkov's final article, which ended the debate, reaffirmed Stalbo's
leading place accorded to sea-based strategic nuclear systems as well as
combat against such systems. Over the years, Gorshkov has tended to overstate
the potential contributions that the fleet In general, or submarines 1n
particular, could make to a future war. Admiral Chernavln, In his Initial
statements as the head of the Soviet Navy has, on the other hand, adopted the
position that naval strategic nuclear forces are but a part of the overall
nuclear triad which also Includes the strategic rocket forces and strategic
aviation. 14
There 1s a temptation to adopt the position that as long as the USSR has
a navy and thinks about how 1t will employ this navy 1n wartime, it must also
have a a naval strategy. Rather than make this presumption, we should take
the Russians at their word, and recognize that, for them, it is important to
repudiate an independent naval strategy. If we are going to better understand
how the marshals and admirals will fight 1n a future war, we had better
attempt to determine how they look at warfare theory.
Simply put, if the Russians insist that there is no independent naval
strategy, we must find out why and get the best perspective that we can on how
they intend to fight. Soviet military authorities do not use the term
"strategic", for example, to describe types of weapons like is done in the
west; Soviet strategic weapons are not simply those that have intercontinental
range or nuclear warheads. "Strategic" to the Soviets, can be, instead, a
reference to the weapons to perform missions that can have an influence on the
situation in vital sectors or theaters. "Strategic" can also refer to a set
of goals that impact either on the war as a whole or upon an individual
theater of military operations.
Similarly, we will have to understand what it is that the Russians mean
by operational art; not with a bias that assumes that since they have one we
need one, but if we can understand the Russian perspective, we should be 1n a
better position to develop our own plans, understand what
types of forces we
should procure, and more accurately prepare threat and net
assessments.
10
Structure of the Theory of the Navy
Figure 1
I Military Science I
I
| Theory of the Navy |
| Theory of the Naval Art |
1. Strategic Employment
of the Navy
2. Operational Art of
the Navy
3. Tactics of the Navy
Adapted from: Morskoy Sbornlk, No. 7, 1983
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